Russian producers are large participants in both domestic and international markets of ferrous and non-ferrous metals. Their market power is limited on the world market due to the presence of competitors, while in Russia most of them have achieved an "almost monopolistic" position strengthened by a high market share as a result protection from import tariffs. During 1999-2011 numerous mergers in these industries were completed and approved by the Federal Antitrust Service -Russia's competition agency. The key problem of merger analysis in Russia's ferrous and non-ferrous metal industries is the trade-off between a (possible) weakening of competition in domestic markets and achieving competitive advantages in international markets. Most merger deals were approved only together with precisely developed merger remedies aimed at preventing dominance abuse. However, it is still unknown whether the weakening of competition and the abuse of dominance on the domestic market as the result of a merger indeed lead to harmful consequences. Using the financial event study method developed by Eckbo and Wier (1985) , this paper empirically verifies the significance of anticompetitive effects of mergers in the domestic ferrous and non-ferrous metal markets. I find that, according to the financial market, mergers between Russian metal producers restrict competition and reduce consumer gains.
Introduction
During the last decade, a process of consolidation in the ferrous and non-ferrous metal market has taken place both in Russia and abroad. The integration process of companies on the market and its influence on the welfare of enterprises on the domestic market are important aspects for analysis. A merger can lead to positive or negative outcomes, depending on the effect of a deal. If it creates synergy effects and increases efficiency due to cost savings, then the effect is positive. On the contrary, if increased market power is the result of a merger and leads to an increase in prices on the market, then the outcome on society's welfare is negative.
A trade-off arises in the Russian metallurgy industry. On the one hand, a merger between Russian mining companies can increase their market power on the world market and create The main aim of this paper is to analyze the influence of mergers on competition in the metallurgy industry in Russia and abroad. Russian producers are large participants on both the domestic and international markets of ferrous and non-ferrous metals. On the world market their bargaining power is limited due to the presence of competitors, while in Russia most of them have achieved an 'almost monopolistic' position that is strengthened by a large market share as a result of the protection from import tariffs. That is why the effects of merger deals on the competition and customers of Russian metal companies might differ substantially.
Thus, it is necessary to assess merger effects. The problem is that it is difficult to measure these effects both before and after a merger and say whether a particular merger has a negative influence on competition. The most common method for analyzing the effects of mergers on social welfare, measured as the sum of producer and consumer surplus, is the financial event study [Eckbo, Weir, 1985] . If the hypothesis of the efficient financial market is correct, then the market must react to the merger announcement via a change in the stock prices of deal participants. Changes in stock prices should reflect the expected redistribution of welfare. For instance, in the case of weakening competition, we expect a profit increase for sellers (both 4 participants and non-participants of a merger deal) and a profit decrease for buyers. Thus, the stock return not only for merger participants but also for main competitors and large buyers also may change. The key element of this methodology is the abnormal return, which is calculated as the difference between the actual return and the return predicted by the market model. If the abnormal return is significantly different from zero, then they may conclude that a merger leads to significant consequences. There is some criticism of this methodology based on the possible bias when using an event study approach for prediction merger outcomes in antitrust cases [Kwoka, Gu, 2013] . For instance, the authors argue that the analysis of rival stock movements might be misinterpreted; a merger announcement might highlight the appearance of an attractive merger opportunity in that industry, causing an increase in the stock prices of rivals such that the conclusion about anticompetitive merger effects might be wrong. Including the stock changes of large buyers eliminates possible misinterpretations, as the combination of rival and buyer reactions enhances the reliability of this paper's conclusion.
The structure of this article reflects its task. The first section analyzes the specific features of the structure of the ferrous and non-ferrous metal market, which affects competition for domestic customers. In the second section a literature review is presented. In the third section I describe the methodology and dataset. The last section discusses the obtained results.
Competition and bargaining power in the Russian metallurgy industry
Metallurgy is one of the key industries of the Russian economy. Its share of GDP is about 5%, while its share of industrial production and export is 18% and 14%, respectively. This industry consists of ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy covering all stages of technological processes from the production and enrichment of raw materials to the production of finished metal products. The structure of Russian metallurgy reflects the orientation of production to its own natural resources, which results in a high share of basic production and an insignificant number of finishing repartitions. Providing more than 40% of internal consumption, the largest metal consumers are the mechanical engineering and construction industries. However their share in Russian industry is only 20%, while in developed countries it reaches the level of 35-50%. Considering this and the insufficiently high growth rates of these industries, the capacity of the domestic metal market in Russia is low and has an insignificant growth tendency. As a result, Russian metallurgy mostly focuses on exports, with more than a half of ferrous metals and 80% of non-ferrous metals being exported. Russian metal producers are deeply integrated into the world market. Table 1 shows the changes of export as a share of production for separate types of metallurgical products, namely cast iron, iron ore, and metal rolling, the dynamics of which are shown from 2005-2011. It should be noted that on average the share exceeds 10%, while in some 5 years, for example with iron ore, it reaches 35%, which confirms an orientation of the Russian metallurgy to the world market. It is significant that along with an increase in the competitiveness of Russian metal producers on the world market, the position of domestic metal buyers is considerably worsening. Their production in Russia suffers from insufficiently developed competition that grows out of two factors: high concentration and high import protection. In Russian metallurgy, concentration is high in comparison with the level of that in relative branches of developed countries.
[Avdasheva, Golovanova, 2009] . During the period of 1999-2011, the CR3 concentration indicator (calculated as the sum of market shares held by the three largest companies in the industry) for almost all Russian ferrous and non-ferrous metal industries was above 50. For example, in 2011 the concentration index in extraction of iron ore was 56.86, in extraction and dressing non-ferrous metal ore (except uranium and thorium ore) the indicator was 63.44, while in aluminum production the indicator was 52.87, and in the production of iron and steel pipes the indicator reached 85.11. However, the metallurgy market's vertical integration is not so deepnot to the retail level, unlike, for example, the oil market -therefore, there are large independent buyers of metal in the market.
One of the possible explanations of the fact that domestic buyers of metal in Russia suffer more from a high level of concentration than foreign buyers do is that Russian metallurgy has the highest level of import protection [FAS report, 2008] . Before 2008 import duties on the majority of metal products were about 5%. Then, due to the financial crisis, these protection tools were increased from 5% to 15% and from 15% to 20% -depending on the position -on the majority of wire and pipes made from ferrous metals. Besides, a 15% preference for domestic producers at government procurements was provided, and anti-dumping and special protective investigations were conducted [The review of ferrous …, Infomayn, 2011].
Over the last ten years the prices of ferrous metals increased more than fourfold. In this situation metal producers enjoyed increased profits, however growing prices have an extremely negative impact on Russian companies with high expenses related to metal by increasing their costs. It is important that, as a result of high market concentration and protection from foreign competition, Russian metal suppliers achieve higher bargaining power on the domestic market than foreign companies do in their own markets. According to international trade theory, internal prices will be set at world levels minus expenses connected with export only if the domestic market of goods is characterized by a high level of competition and low barriers to entry.
Otherwise, when domestic producers possess market power and have the opportunity to carry out price discrimination, the price of goods will be higher in the market with less elastic demand, i.e.
in the domestic market. This statement is confirmed by various papers, showing that prices for Russian exports in the domestic market are higher than when exporting [Golovanova, 2010] .
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Although possessing bargaining power in the domestic market, sellers face high competition in foreign markets, and this pushes them to apply a third type of price discrimination.
This situation attracts close attention from government authorities. The problem is that it is difficult to determine whether it is better not to disturb the strengthening of Russian metal producers in the global market or to apply tools for supporting internal buyers of metal. The integration of domestic metal companies is accompanied by a positive effect that is expressed in an increase in their international competitiveness, and a negative effect in an increase in their Other metallurgic enterprises have also increased their competitiveness on the world market. For example, EVRAZ demonstrates a strengthening of its own position on the world market after a series of successful merges. Now EVRAZ ranks in the top 20 among the world's largest steel producers and is the world leader on the vanadium market and on the market of railway production [Annual report of EVRAZ, 2012]. 8 It is important that mergers between these companies were allowed on the basis of exacting remedies, and, even despite the implementation of these remedies, companies were accused of abusing their dominant position. For example, during approval of the merger between NLMK and VIZ-Stal, the companies were assigned a set of remedies, according to which they, in particular, cannot increase the price of electric steel by more than 3% a month for 20 years without prior notice of the Federal Antitrust Service, and also must execute earlier signed contracts. However, five years later FAS admitted to the fact that NLMK and VIZ-Stal abused their dominant market positions by establishing high prices for electric anisotropic steel, and appointed a penalty of 97.6 million rubles. A similar situation happened after a merger between EVRAZ and Raspadskaya: The companies were accused of abusing a dominant position on the coking coal market.
Thus, it is important to emphasize the absolute inexpediency of strengthening the competitiveness of Russian metallurgists on the world market only for maintaining of domestic metal consumers. Certainly, such state measures are necessary, which would not only protect Russian metal producers on the world market, but also increase the competitiveness of processing industries through a price decrease for raw materials. However, how to do this is unknown. The task facing the Federal Antitrust Service is very difficult and even an analysis of international experience does not provide ideas for a solution. The reason is that the Russian economy has a special structure due to its Soviet origins in which producers were created based on domestic production. The Soviet system was isolated from the world market.
Literature review
In the literature devoted to mergers and acquisitions, there is much evidence that shareholders of merging companies receive benefits from such deals [Aktas, Derbaix, 2003] . It is assumed that this is due to the fact that an acquirer initiates a reevaluation of its shares due to the MPH is based on the idea that after a merger the new firm has an opportunity to limit competition and, as a result, receives additional benefits. Within MPH it is possible to distinguish two sub-hypotheses. First, according to the Collusion Hypothesis the merger leads to cooperation among members of the merger's industry. Since an efficient collusion creates a monopolistic profit, it is necessary to expect positive abnormal returns for merging firms and 9 their rivals. On the other hand, it would decrease the wealth of consumers and lead to negative abnormal returns for them. Second, according to the Predatory Pricing Model the merger could help the new firm to decrease prices below the average variable cost level in order to force competitors to leave the market and raise prices thereafter. In such a case it is likely to expect a fall in the stock prices of rivals and a decrease in the welfare of buyers. Actually, this idea is not typical for the metallurgy industry because the share of fixed costs in average costs is so high that in order to force a company to leave the market it is necessary to decrease prices drastically.
Moreover, there is no leader who can follow such a strategy.
According to EH, the new firm provides more cost-effective production due to synergy effects. In this area two different effects can also be distinguished. The productivity effect says that due to economies of scale the new firm can implement a technological innovation that would decrease their average costs and prices for customers and as a result lower the rival's market value. Due to the information effect, news about the merger signals to competitors an opportunity to raise productivity, which consequently will lead to an increase in share prices.
Early papers investigating only the change in stock price of participants of a merger generally come to the conclusion about the value or profit creation for buyers. Ruback [1983] shows that as a result of a merger the welfare of the acquired company's shareholders increases and the welfare of acquiring company's shareholders does not decline, and not due to an increase To summarize, I expect that mergers will have a negative influence on competition in the Russian metallurgy industry due to its main peculiarities: high concentration, vertical integration, and protection against import. Thus, the main hypotheses in this paper are as follows:
1. The stock market estimates mergers with Russian companies in the metal industry to be more harmful for buyers of metal due to opportunities for competition restriction. It can be true in two alternatives:
1.1 Russian merger deals have a negative impact on domestic companies and a neutral effect on foreign buyers of metal.
Russian mergers have a more negative impact on other companies in comparison with
foreign mergers.
2. The stock market estimates horizontal mergers as more detrimental to competition in comparison with vertical deals. This hypothesis is subordinate, but it is obligatory to check it because I expect hypothesis 1 to be valid mainly for horizontal mergers.
Data and methodology

Data on mergers is obtained from the Thomson database, which includes information
concerning deal values, dates of announcement, participant details, and so forth, and from the website of the European Commission. 3 The sample consists of the 60 biggest deals (according to the ratio of merger participant capitalization to the capitalization of the relevant markets), half of which are between foreign companies and the others include a Russian company as either the bidder or the target (see Appendix). Tab.1 presents average characteristics of the analyzed sample compared to the entire amount of mergers and acquisitions in the metals and mining industry. On average, acquirers in the sample buy more than 80 per cent of a target's shares and the enterprise or equity values are higher than in the industry sample. The condition that at least one merger participant had shares on the stock market 250 days prior to a merger announcement date was an important selection criterion for transactions.
Observance of this criterion is needed for the market model estimation according to event study 
where is the current return for security i at day t, is the return on an appropriate market index at day t Second, based on estimated coefficients from (1), I calculate abnormal returns for security i at day t:
where ̂ and ̂ are OLS values from the estimation period
Often it is not possible to precisely estimate an event date due to the time of information distribution. As such I am interested in the performance not only at the announcement date, but also over the period surrounding the event. The common way to do this is to calculate cumulative abnormal returns: ,
where t1 and t2 are the boundaries for the event period
Then I run a t-test to calculate whether CARs are significantly different from zero at a significant level. The null hypothesis is that the cumulative abnormal return is equal to zero:
T-statistics are given by:
where CAAR is the cumulative average abnormal return, s is cross-sectional variance of the abnormal returns in period t:
However, the assumption that all abnormal returns are equally distributed is too rigid as some stocks are more volatile than others. The inclusion of such stocks into the dataset can lead to a high dispersion of ARi and, as a result, to decrease the power of tests.
In this regard, I use a standardization procedure [Brown, Warner, 1985] . For this purpose, the standardized abnormal return (SARit) is calculated by division of abnormal return into its standard deviation (si) calculated on an analyzed interval (t1, t2): implement a standardization procedure which results in a higher power of statistical test [Bartholdy et al, 2011] . It is, of course, a necessary condition for this methodology that analyzed 13 companies are all quoted on the stock market, but in this paper this is especially the case, because I inherently consider the largest producers and buyers of metal.
Results
The results confirm the main hypothesis. According to the stock market estimation, mergers involving Russian companies are more dangerous for competition and, therefore, detrimental to buyers. Russian mergers lead to a negative abnormal return for domestic buyers equivalent to 1.98 standard deviations during the period surrounding the announcement date (-5 days, +5 days). It is important that Russian deals do not have any significant impact on the welfare of foreign buyers, which proves the hypothesis. The foreign mergers effect on their customers is not statistically significant. The impact on competitors, both on domestic and foreign, is negative and significant as expected, the coefficient for the reaction of stocks of domestic competitors is higher than for foreign ones.
Tab. 2. T-statistics for SAR (30 deals with Russian companies)
Analyzed period (0 -announcement day) (-5, +5) (-3, +20) *, **, *** -significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively
The data illustrates that for merger participants it is impossible to unambiguously define a sign of abnormal return, and the results are not statistically significant. The problem is that in the analyzed dataset, deal participants are mostly acquiring companies, as there is no data on the stock prices of target-companies due to the legal form of these organizations. These results are comparable to that of Ekbo [1983] , who shows that the abnormal returns for acquirers are insignificant. However, target-companies in most cases receive a positive abnormal return, which partly confirms the idea of maximizing company value after a merger.
As for foreign transactions (see Tab. 3), their influence on both foreign and domestic metal buyers is statistically insignificant. Thus, an application of the event study approach confirmed the assumption that Russian suppliers of metal on the domestic market possess more bargaining power than do foreign companies. 
Tab. 4. T-statistics for SAR (44 horizontal mergers)
Analyzed period (0 -announcement day) (-5, +5) (-3, +20) The analysis confirms that the stock market does expect a deterioration of buyer positions as a result of mergers between large metal producers. Therefore, choosing necessary tools of economic policy is extremely important. At present the Russian competition authority is beginning to correct the behavior of large players on the metals market by obligating them to develop trading policies and publish them in open access. These trading policies should also be the basis for price setting. Technically, the document should contain a list of factors for price setting, such as production quality, seasonality, profitability of production, etc. In general terms, this is the introduction of price regulation on the metallurgy market, as the statement of this methodology assumes that this pricing is the only true method, and any deviation from it will be treated as a violation of antitrust law. It once again confirms that the problem in this industry is so sharp that the Federal Antitrust Service is ready to introduce price regulations. However, the 16 efficiency of these measures is not unambiguous. There are several possible consequences, including the effect of "creeping regulation", which distorts the incentives of market agents and arises when a legislator that is not able to reach the purposes set earlier enters additional norms.
Other consequences include the emergence of additional expenses of control by the Federal Antitrust Service in Russia, and the restriction of contract alternatives instead of a search of mutually advantageous forms of cooperation [Radchenko et al, 2013] . The consequences of applying trade policies for the metallurgy industry in the Russian Federation are also unambiguous. Increases in world demand for metal and Russia's entry into the World Trade
Organization demand a revision of protectionism and the refusal of market regulation. However, the use of the "fair prices" on the domestic metal market, equal to minimum export prices, can not only interfere with competition development in the domestic market, but also lead to a decrease in competitiveness for Russian metal producers on the world market.
At present, the main methods of competition policy in Russia are protective measures, i.e. the application of antitrust law that is generally aimed at the elimination of offenses, instead of at developing competition. Thus, there is a necessity to use tools for promoting the development of competition on commodity markets, such as tax policy, tariff and duties regulation, government procurements, and tariff regulation of natural monopolies. In particular, the reduction of the quantity and size of import duties can have a positive impact on competition in industries where a high concentration of domestic production leads to the deterioration of competitive conditions in relevant commodity markets. Coming back to the analysis of metallurgy in the Russian Federation, it should be noted that the elimination of import protection for metallurgy in Russia could positively affect competition and prices on the market by restricting the bargaining power of large metal producers.
Conclusions
A comparison of the effects of mergers with Russian companies and foreign mergers in the market sector of ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy leads to the conclusion that, according to financial markets, mergers between Russian metal producers have a negative impact on the gains of Russian metal buyers. In other words, Russian suppliers of metal on the domestic market have more bargaining power than foreign companies do on their markets, hence they may achieve a dominant position and abuse it at the expense of buyers. The main reason for this is that for nearly 15 years the Russian metal market combined two peculiarities that served to weaken competition -high concentration and protection against imports. The obtained results do not provide evidence to state that the position of metal buyers indeed worsened as a result of mergers. However, the stock market did expect this. Many antitrust complaints from Russian buyers of metal also prove that negative effects indeed exist. This is why the implementation of policy options is becoming a relevant topic.
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